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1THE THREE MUSKETEERS: FOUR CLASSICAL
SOLUTIONS TO BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar
ABSTRACT
This paper provides a comparative analysis of some classical solutions
to bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic viewpoint. These rules are the
constrained equal-awards rule, the constrained equal-losses rule, the propor-
tional rule and the Talmud rule. The purpose of this study is to facilitate
the understanding of their di¤erences and to clarify the type of situations in
w h i c he a c ho ft h e s er u l e si sb e t t e r .
Key-words: Bankruptcy problems, proportional solution, equal-awards
solution, equal-losses solution, Talmud solution.
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21I N T R O D U C T I O N
A bankruptcy problem is a distribution problem involving the allocation of a
given amount of a single (perfectly divisible) good among a group of agents,
when this amount is insu¢cient to satisfy all their demands. This type of
problem arises in many real life situations. The canonical example is that
of a bankrupt …rm that is to be liquidated; namely, a situation in which
the creditors’ entitlements exceed the worth of the …rm. Another familiar
example refers to the division of an estate among several heirs when the
estate falls short of the deceased’s commitments. A di¤erent case is that in
which, in a …xprice setting, the demand for a given commodity exceeds the
available supply. The collection of a given amount of taxes in a community
can also be given this form.
The available quantity of the good to be divided is usually called the es-
tate. The agents are also referred to as creditors,w h e r e a st h et e r mclaims
is meant to describe the agents’ entitlements, demands or needs, depend-
ing upon the problem at hand. A solution to a bankruptcy problem is to
be interpreted as the application of an allocation rule that gives a sensible
d i s t r i b u t i o no ft h ee s t a t ea saf u n c t i o no fa g e n t s ’c l a i m s .T h e r e f o r e ,w ea r e
interested in the analysis of rules that can be applied to a family of problems,
rather than in the solvability of a particular problem. Note that, within this
context, one can also think of allocation rules as rationing schemes that dis-
tribute the existing shortages. Indeed, this dual interpretation will play a
signi…cant role in the sequel and will prove extremely useful in simplifying
the discussion.
Alternative rules typically represent di¤erent ways of applying a fairness
criterion to the resolution of bankruptcy problems. The analysis of their
structural properties permits one to select a particular rule by choosing the
set of these properties that this rule satis…es. This venue becomes more
fruitful the closer we get to the following recommendations:
(1) Each property is intuitive and represents a single and clear ethical
principle.
(2) We can identify each rule as the only one satisfying a distinctive set
of properties (that is, a collection of these properties characterizes the rule);
moreover all these properties are logically independent.
(3) This set of distinctive properties is small whereas alternative rules
share most of the properties (in order to clearly identify their ethical di¤er-
ences).
Structural properties express invariance of the solutions with respect to
changes in the parameters, and are usually motivated by particular concerns.
They are intended to ensure that the solution has some desirable features or
3to prevent some inconveniences. Hence it is not surprising that a particular
rule can be characterized by di¤erent sets of independent axioms. Each
characterization provides an insight on the type of problems for which a rule
is satisfactory. The reader is referred to Thomson (1998) for a discussion of
the axiomatic method.
The resolution of bankruptcy-like situations is a major practical issue and
has a long history as a conceptual problem [see the references provided in Ra-
binovitch (1973), O’Neill (1982), Aumann & Maschler (1985), Young (1994,
ch. 4)]. Modern economic analysis has addressed this class of problems from
two main perspectives. The …rst one is the game theoretic approach, where
a bankruptcy problem is formulated as a TU game [see for instance O’Neill
(1982), Aumann & Maschler (1985), Curiel, Maschler & Tijs (1988), Dagan
& Volij (1993)]. The second one is the axiomatic method, where alternative
solutions are characterized in terms of intuitive properties that express di¤er-
ent value judgements [e.g. Young (1987), Dagan (1996), Herrero, Maschler
& Villar (1999), Herrero & Villar (1998)]. The reader is referred to Thomson
(1995) for a survey of this literature.
This paper provides a comparative analysis of three main rules to solve
bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic viewpoint. These are:
(i) The proportional rule, that divides the estate proportionally to the
agents’ claims.
(ii) The constrained equal-awards rule, that divides equally the estate
among the agents under the condition that nobody gets more than her claim.
(iii) The constrained equal-losses rule, that divides equally the di¤erence
between the aggregate claim and the estate, provided no agent ends up with
a negative transfer.
The proportional rule satis…es a number of appealing properties and,
when compared with other rules, it has much to recommend itself. The idea
of equality underlies another well-known rule: the constrained equal-awards
rule. It makes awards as equal as possible, subject to the condition that no
creditor receives more than her claim. A dual formulation of equality, focus-
ing on the losses creditors incur as opposed to what they receive, underlies
the constrained equal-losses rule. It proposes a distribution of the estate in
which agents’ losses are as equal as possible, subject to the condition that
no one ends up with a negative award.
The choice of these three solutions is by no means arbitrary. First because
they are among the most common methods of solving practical problems.
Second for their long tradition in history. And last but not least, because
they are almost the only sensible ones within the family of solutions that
4treat equally equal claims. As Moulin (1997, p. 3) puts it: “One unambigu-
ous conclusion emerges from the axiomatic analysis of rationing methods:
... [these three rules] stand out by virtue of their multifarious axiomatic
properties”.
As the Three Musketeers were four so are our three rules. The Talmud
rule will play here the role of D’Artagnan. This is an appealing allocation
rule that amounts to solve bankruptcy problems by combining the principles
that inform the three rules above. It is worth stressing that even though
all these rules are far from new, their axiomatization turns out to be quite
recent.
So, if the rules are old and their characterization has already been done,
what is new here? On the one hand, there is a methodological contribution
since the discussion is based on the use of the duality relationship both for
rules and properties. This approach greatly simpli…es the analysis dispensing
with the need of proving some results and making the proofs rather elemen-
tary. On the other hand, there is an analytical contribution in the sense that
we provide new properties and new characterizations of these rules. The
combination of these two features brings about an extremely easy compar-
ative analysis that helps clarifying the class of real life problems for which
each of these rules might be better. Following the recommendations given
above, we concentrate on characterizations that permit an easy comparison
of these rules (in particular, all rules can be compared in terms of a single
di¤erential property).
The paper is organized as follows. We start by formally introducing the
family of bankruptcy problems and the three basic rules. Then we present
several appealing properties for bankruptcy rules and o¤er di¤erent charac-
terizations of the three selected rules. The Talmud rule is discussed next. A
…nal section commenting on the relationship between these rules closes the
paper.
2 THREE OLD BANKRUPTCY RULES
2.1 Preliminaries
We aim at modelling the situation faced by an arbitrator that has to allo-
cate a given amount of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of
claimants, when the available amount is not enough to satisfy all the admis-
sible demands. The data of the problem are the amount of the good to be
distributed, the number of agents, and their claims. The arbitrator has to
5apply some ethical and procedural criteria to solve the problem, criteria that
may depend on the nature of the problem under consideration.1
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a …nite set of agents that represents a collectivity
( a l s or e f e r r e dt oa sthe society). For notational simplicity we take jNj = n.A
bankruptcy problem for N is a pair (E;c); where E 2 R+ represents the
estate (the amount of the good to be distributed), and c 2 Rn
+ is a vector
of claims (demands, needs, rights, etc.). The ith component of c; denoted
by ci; represents the ith agent’s individual claim, for all i 2 N.S i n c e o u r
analysis focuses on bankruptcy problems it is assumed along the text that P
i2N ci ¸ E and also that E>0: The family of all those problems is denoted
by BN:
A rule for BN is a mapping F that associates with every (E;c) 2 BN a
unique point F(E;c) 2 Rn such that:




The point F(E;c) is to be interpreted as a desirable way of dividing E
among the creditors in N: Requirement (i) is that each creditor receives an
award that is non-negative and bounded above by her claim. Requirement
(ii) is that the entire estate is to be allocated. These two requirements imply
that F(E;c)=c whenever E =
P
i2N ci: It is implicitly assumed that F
is homogeneous of degree one in (E;c),m e a n i n gt h a tE; c and F(:) are
measured in the same units.
A more general model refers to the case of a variable population.L e tN
denote the set of all potential agents (a set with an in…nite number of mem-
bers), and let N be the family of all …nite subsets of N: For any N 2N ;
we denote by n the cardinal of N; as before. Now a bankruptcy problem
is a triple (N;E;c); where N 2Nstands for the particular set of agents
involved in this problem, E 2 R+ is the estate, and c 2 Rn
+ is the vec-
tor of claims, with
P
i2N ci ¸ E: We shall denote by B =
S
N2NBN the
family of all such bankruptcy problems with variable population. In this
context a rule is a mapping F that associates with every (N;E;c) 2 B a
unique point F(N;E;c) 2 Rn; such that: (i) 0 · F(N;E;c) · c and (ii) P
i2N Fi(N;E;c)=E:
To simplify notation, for any given problem (E;c) 2 BN; we call C the
1We focus our analysis on those problems in which each individual has a claim to some
quantity of a common asset, but the claims are not against speci…c portions of the asset.
Moreover, our approach …ts better the “involuntary claims” case, as incentives are not an
issue. See the discussion in Young (1994, ch. 4).




ci;L = C ¡ E
Note that solving a bankruptcy problem may be interpreted in two dif-
ferent ways. One is that of distributing what it is,n a m e l yE; as function of
the claims vector c: The other is that of allocating what it is missing,n a m e l y
L; with respect to the claims. This dual interpretation of the problem can
be used to derive new rules and properties. Let us make precise these ideas.
Both in the …xed population and in the variable population framework,
for any given rule F we can consider another rule associated to it by means
of a duality procedure. This duality procedure can be easily explained in the
following way: Suppose that, when solving a problem, we start by temporar-
ily awarding every agent her claim. Since this is not feasible, now we apply
rule F to the problem of allocating losses. By this operation we obtain a new
rule, the dual rule of the initially used. Formally,
Dual rule of F, F ¤ (Aumann and Maschler, 1985): For all N 2Nand all
(E;c) 2 BN, F ¤(E;c)=c ¡ F(L;c):
The rules F and F ¤ are related in a simple way: F¤ divides what is
available in the same way as F divides what is missing. Note that, for all
(E;c) 2 BN; it follows that C>L¸ 0 so that (L;c) 2 BN.M o r e o v e r ,
0 · F(L;c) · c and
P
i2N Fi(L;c)=L; so that 0 · F ¤(E;c) · c and P
i2N F ¤
i (E;c)=E; that is, F¤ is well de…ned.
It is worth observing that duality is an idempotent operation, that is,
(F ¤)¤ = F: The notion of duality is naturally extended to the properties a
solution satis…es. Formally,
Dual properties: Given two properties P, P¤,w es a yt h a tP¤ is the dual
property of P i fa n do n l yi ff o rv e r yr u l eF that satis…es P its dual rule
F ¤ satis…es P¤:
The following result is an immediate consequence of the de…nitions given
above:
Theorem 0. If a rule F is characterized by a set of independent properties
¦=f©1;©2;:::;©kg; then the dual rule F ¤ is characterized by the correspond-
ing set of dual properties ¦¤ = f©¤
1;©¤
2;:::;©¤
kg: Moreover, the properties in
¦¤ are also independent.
Proof. Suppose that a rule F is characterized by a set of independent







k: Suppose that F¤ is not characterized by the set ¦¤: This implies
the existence of another rule G that satis…es all properties in ¦¤: But is such
ac a s e ,G¤ must satisfy all properties in ¦ which is only possible if G¤ = F:
This is a contradiction since the duality relation is idempotent.
Now suppose that the properties in ¦¤ are not independent. This implies
that there is a property Á
¤
j that can be eliminated without a¤ecting the
characterization of F ¤; that is, F¤ () ¦¤¡fÁ
¤
jg. But in this case it follows
that F () ¦ ¡f Ájg; against the assumption.
This preliminary theorem will allow us to simplify substantially the en-
suing discussion, since many of the rules and properties analyzed exhibit the
duality relationship.
2.2 The three musketeers
The time is ripe to present our …rst three rules. Each of these rules applies the
idea of “equality” focusing on a particular reference variable (ratios, awards,
losses).
The …rst is the proportional rule, probably the best known and most
widely used solution concept. This rule distributes awards proportionally
to claims. Hence it equalizes the ratios between claims and awards. It is
formally de…ned as follows:
Proportional rule, P: For all N 2N; all (E;c) 2 BN; and all i 2 N,
P(E;c)=¸c
Note that the very de…nition of a rule implies that ¸ = E
C 2 (0;1]:
The second is the constrained equal-awards rule. The underlying idea is
that every agent should receive the same amount as long as this does not
exceed her claim. Hence it equalizes the awards, under the restriction given
by the de…nition of a solution. As it is made explicit in Aumann and Maschler
(1985), “this rule has been adopted as law by most major codi…ers, including
Maimonides (in his Laws for Lending and Borrowing)”.F o r m a l l y ,
Constrained equal-awards rule, CEA:F o ra l lN 2N; all (E;c) 2 BN;
and all i 2 N;
CEAi(E;c)=m i n fci;¸g
8The de…nition of a rule implies that ¸ solves
P
i2N minfci;¸g = E:
Our third rule proposes to distribute equally the di¤erence between the
estate and the aggregate claims. Namely, to give each agent the amount
ci ¡ L
n: Yet, as this amount might be negative, the solution applies this
principle with one proviso: no agent ends up with a negative transfer. Hence
the constrained equal-loss solution equalizes the rationing experienced by
the agents, as long as this is compatible with feasibility. >From a geometric
viewpoint this way of solving the problem amounts to selecting that point
in the feasible set which is closest to the vector of claims (according to the
Euclidean distance). Aumann and Maschler (1985) point out that this rule
also appears in Maimonides, dealing with auctions and looking at the losses
the seller may experience when bidders renege (in his Laws of Appraisal).
Constrained equal-losses rule, CEL: For all N 2N ; all (E;c) 2 BN;
and all i 2 N;
CELi(E;c)=m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸g
The de…nition of a rule implies that ¸ solves
P
i2N maxf0;c i ¡ ¸g = E:
The constrained equal-awards rule corresponds to the uniform rule in the
case of distribution problems with single-peaked preferences, when the task
is smaller than the supply of e¤ort. In the context of taxation this rule is
known as the “head tax”. The principle underlying the constrained equal-
losses rule, the equal-loss principle, has been applied to other distribution
problems, such as cost-sharing, taxation or axiomatic bargaining [see Young
(1987), (1988), Chun (1988b), Herrero and Marco (1993)]. In the context of
taxation it is known as the “leveling tax”.
The reader can easily check that the constrained equal-awards rule and
the constrained equal-losses rule are dual from each other, whereas the pro-





3 FOUR COMMON PROPERTIES AND A
JOINT CHARACTERIZATON
Let us now introduce four basic properties that these three solutions do
satisfy. The …rst, equal treatment of equals, has a clear ethical content.
9The remaining three, composition, path independence and consistency, can
be regarded as procedural requirements. They prevent the solution of a
problem to be dependent on the agenda or unstable with respect to subgroup
renegotiations.
3.1 Equal treatment of equals
This is probably the most basic equity requirement: agents with identical
claims should be treated identically. Hence, we exclude di¤erentiating be-
tween agents on the basis of their names, gender, religion, political ideas, etc.
Formally:
Equal treatment of equals: For all N 2N ; all (E;c) 2 BN; and all
i;j 2 N; ci = cj implies Fi(b)=Fj(b):
Equal treatment of equals is an instance of impartiality. It establishes
that all agents with the same claims will receive the same amount.
Mind that this property says neither that everybody is equal nor that
one should treat all agents equally. It says that when two agents are indis-
tinguishable, with regard to the problem under consideration, they should
be treated equally. The very de…nition of a bankruptcy problem as a pair
(E;c) implies discarding any information about individuals other than their
claims. Therefore, in this case equal treatment of equals collapses to “agents
with equal claims receive the same”. But this need not be the case in a more
general setting (e.g. Moulin, 1997).
3.2 Composition and path independence
In order to motivate the next property think of the case of a bankrupt …rm
endowed with two types of assets (buildings and machinery, say). Suppose
that these two assets are sold to di¤erent buyers in di¤erent dates. After
selling the …rst asset the amount obtained is distributed among the …rm’s
creditors according to some pre-established rule. When the second asset is
sold its price is distributed again among the creditors, reducing their claims
by the amount already obtained. It seems reasonable to require that the
…nal allocation of the …rm’s worth should not depend on the order in which
these two assets are sold, provided the total price is the same. In particular
one would require to get the same outcome whether the …rm is liquidated
one shot or it is done by parts (assuming again that the total price does not
change). The property of composition makes precise this requirement:
10Composition (Young, 1988): For all N 2N ; all (E;c) 2 BN; and all
E1;E 2 2 R+ such that E1 + E2 = E;
F(E;c)=F(E1;c)+F [E2;c¡ F(E1;c)]
This property says that the problem (E;c) c a na l s ob es o l v e da st h e
sum of two partial problems. The …rst corresponds to a problem with the
initial claims c and a fraction E1 of the estate. The second is that problem
made out of the outstanding claims c ¡ F(E1;c) and the reminder estate,
E¡
P
i2N Fi(E1;c). When a solution satis…es composition, solving a problem
in stages does not change agents’ …nal awards.
A slightly di¤erent interpretation of this property is the following [cf.
Moulin (1997)]: Suppose that, when faced with a set of creditors whose
claims are given by a vector c, a conservative arbitrator makes an estimation
of the budget equal to E1 and recommends an allocation F(E1;c): Later
the arbitrator discovers the budget is actually larger than estimated so that
there is still a portion E2 to be distributed, with respect to the outstanding
claims [c¡F(E1;c)]: Composition requires that this allocation of the resources
(E1+E2) in two steps yields precisely the same result as the direct allocation
of (E1 + E2) according to the initial claims, c:
Think again of the situation faced by an arbitrator that makes a tentative
division of the estate based on an estimate of its value. Contrary to the former
case now suppose that once the tentative division is done, it turns out that
the actual value of the estate falls short of what was assumed. Then, two
options are open: either the tentative division is cancelled altogether and the
actual problem is solved, or the rule is applied to the problem in which the
initial claims are substituted by the (unfeasible) allocation initially proposed.
Path independence says that both procedures should yield the same outcome.
Formally:
Path Independence (Moulin, 1987): For all N 2N; all (E;c) 2 BN,a n d
all E0 >E ;we have F(E;c)=F [E;F(E0;c)]
Path independence is a property that applies when after solving a problem
(E0;c) it turns out that the actual worth of the estate E falls short of what
was expected. It requires in this case that the solution of the real problem
(E;c) b et h es a m ea st h a to ft h ep r o b l e mw i t he s t a t eE and a vector of claims
c0 = F(E0;c):
11It is easy to see that if a rule satis…es either composition or path-independence
it is monotonic with respect to the estate. That is, for any two problems
(E;c);(E0;c) 2 BN;E· E0 implies Fi(E;c) · Fi(E0;c); for all i 2 N:
Moreover:
² Claim 1. If solution F satis…es either composition or path indepen-
dence then Fi(E;c) is continuous in E; for all i 2 N:
² Claim 2. Composition and path independence are dual properties.
3.3 Consistency
This property refers to the case of a variable population. Consistency is
a powerful property that links the solution to a problem for a given soci-
ety N with the solutions of the problems corresponding to its sub-societies.
To formally de…ne this notion, let S be a proper subset of N and suppose
that, after solving a problem (N;E;c) by means of the rule F; the mem-





i2S Fi(N;E;c);c S] be the associated reduced problem, where cS =
(ci)i2S.T h er u l eF is consistent if applied to any of its reduced problems it
gives the incumbent agents the same amounts they obtained in the original
problem. Formally:




Consistency is a procedural requirement with two relevant implications:
(i) Once an allocation has been agreed upon, no group of agents is willing
to re-apply the rule in the reduced problem that appears when the other
agents leave bringing with them their allotted shares. Hence, what is good
for the large group is also good for the smaller ones.
(ii) If the agreement on how to solve a two-person problem can be con-
sistently extended to any number of them, then that extension is unique.
Hence, what is good for the smallest possible group is good for larger ones.2
The …rst implication provides us with a stability feature: consistency
prevents subgroups of agents to renegotiate once there is a solution proposed
for the society. The second one helps in assessing the value judgements
2The requirement of agreement on the shares from small groups to large groups is
usually refered to as “converse consistency”. In general, consistency and its converse
are independent properties, but in the case of bankruptcy problems if a rule satis…es
consistency it also satis…es converse consistency. See Chun (1998).
12of alternative solutions, as what is “fair” is usually easier to check and to
understand in the two-person case.
Remark 1 It may happen that no consistent extension of a particular so-
lution exists [see Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997)]. The uniqueness in the
procedure of consistently extending solutions to bankruptcy problems was …rst
noticed by Aumann and Maschler (1985) for the consistent extension of the
contested garment rule.
² Claim 3. The three rules, P; CEA; and CEL satisfy equal treatment
of equals, consistency, composition, and path-independence.
3.4 A joint characterization
We have just mentioned that the proportional rule, the constrained equal-
awards rule, and the constrained equal-losses rule all satisfy the properties
of equal treatment of equals, composition, path-independence and consis-
tency. The following result tells us that these rules are actually the only ones
satisfying all these requirements.
Theorem 1 (Moulin, 1997, Corol. to Th. 2) T h e r ea r et h r e ea n do n l yt h r e e
rules on B satisfying simultaneously equal treatment of equals, composition,
path-independence, and consistency: The proportional rule, the constrained
equal-awards rule, and the constrained equal-losses rule.
This result provides additional support to the choice of the three bankruptcy
rules discussed so far. One way of checking the strength of this theorem is by
asking ourselves what property to drop in order to buy other solutions. On
the one hand, equal treatment of equals seems di¢cult to object unless we
consider a wider family of problems in which agents have other relevant dif-
ferences, to be included in the information that describes the problem. Com-
position, path-independence and consistency can be regarded as procedural
requirements. The …rst two ensure coherence with respect to subdivisions of
the estate; the third one ensures coherence with respect to all reduced prob-
lems, when some of the agents leave taking with them their allotted shares.
If either composition or path-independence fails, then the outcome of the res-
olution becomes dependent on the agenda. That is to say, it varies according
to the way in which the problem is subdivided into partial problems. The
lack of consistency implies that the resolution of the problem proposed by
the rule may be altered by renegotiations within population subgroups.
134 THE THREE MUSKETEERS IN FOCUS
Once we know the features that these rules have in common we have to …nd
those properties that permit one to separate them. It will be shown that the
equal awards rule obtains when we give priority in the distribution to those
agents with smaller claims and the equal losses rule obtains when priority is
given to those agents with larger claims. The proportional solution remains
in the mid-way, as it gives priority in the distribution neither to large nor
small claims.
4.1 Exemption and exclusion
These two properties refer to the behaviour of a rule when agents’ claims are
very asymmetric. They embody two opposite principles of claims enforce-
ability that express clear cut values on how allocation rules should perform
in extreme situations.3 They will help us choosing among di¤erent rules,
depending upon the problem at hand.
The …rst property considered, exemption, establishes that when the re-
sources to be divided are large enough relative to the agents’ claims, only
those individuals with larger claims are to be rationed. This is an instance of
the general principle of progressivity, according to which those agents with
smaller claims are given priority in the distribution and can actually be ex-
empted from being rationed. More precisely, exemption says that when the
claim of an individual is smaller than equal division, the rule should grant her
the full claim. In the context of taxation problems4 this property establishes
that those individuals whose income is below the average tax burden should
be exempted.
Formally:
Exemption: For all N 2Nand for all (E;c) 2 BN,i fci · E
n then Fi(E;c)=
ci:
The rationale of this principle is twofold. On the one hand, it re‡ects the
idea that the small claimants cannot be held responsible for the shortage.
Indeed, would all agents have claims smaller than E=n there would be no
bankruptcy at all. On the other hand, it can be associated with the idea that
3John Stuart Mill (1859) argued that the strength of our moral values is to be judged
in extreme situations.
4The problem (E;c) 2 Rn corresponds to a tax problem when E is interpreted as a
given amount of taxes to be collected in a society N; and c is interpreted as the vector of
agents’ gross incomes.
14small claimants correspond to relatively poorer people for whom the claims
represent a larger fraction of their wealth.
It is worth noting that this principle is applied by Law in some real-life
bankruptcy problems, as it is the case of …nancial intermediaries, where the
debts of clients with small savings are honored …rst. The exemption of small
incomes in a tax system is also an obvious instance of this principle.
The following property, exclusion, conveys the opposite message: those
agents with very low claims are to be disregarded. To make this precise, let
(E;c) 2 B be a bankruptcy problem. The number L
n is the average rationing
experienced by the agents in problem (E;c): We say that the ith agent’s
c l a i mi sr e s i d u a li fi ti ss m a l l e rt h a nt h eper capita loss. Namely, if ci · L
n.
Exclusion says that residual claims are ignored. Formally:
Exclusion: For all N 2Nand for all (E;c) 2 BN, Fi(E;c)=0whenever
ci · L
n:
This property simply says that when the claim of agent i is so small that
it does not reach the average loss, then she gets nothing. In other words,
the solution to the problem (E;c) coincides with that of the problem F(E;b c)
that results from substituting c by the vector b c given by b ci =m a x f0;c i¡ L
ng;
i 2 N:
The principle behind this property is also used in many real-life situations.
An illustration can be obtained from many public health systems, in which
major diseases are fully covered whereas minor a¤ections are excluded (e.g.
heart attacks versus headaches).
The CEA rule satis…es exemption and fails to satisfy exclusion. The
CEL rule, on the contrary, satis…es exclusion and fails to satisfy exemption.
The proportional rule fails to satisfy both properties. Moreover,
² Claim 4. Exemption and exclusion are dual properties. Moreover,
there is no rule that can satisfy these two properties simultaneously.
The following results tell us the bite of these properties:
Theorem 2 The constrained equal-awards rule is the only rule in B satisfying
equal treatment of equals, path-independence, consistency and exemption.
Proof. It is easy to see that the CEA rule satis…es these properties.
Let us prove the converse.
15Since consistency and converse consistency are equivalent in bankruptcy
problems, it is enough to prove the result for the two-person case.
Let (E;c) 2 B2: If c1 = c2; then equal treatment of equals implies
F1(E;c)=F2(E;c)=E
2 which is the CEA for this case. Let c1 6= c2;
without loss of generality let c1 <c 2: There are two cases to be considered.
T a k e… r s tt h ec a s ei nw h i c hE
2 ¸ c1: By exemption, F1(E;c)=c1;
F2(E;c)=E ¡ c1; which is the CEA solution in this case.
Now suppose that E
2 <c 1: Let E0 =2 c1 >E :By exemption if follows
that F1(E0;c)=F2(E0;c)=c1: Path independence implies that F(E;c)=







the CEA solution for this case.
Theorem 3 The constrained equal-losses rule is the only rule in BN satisfy-
ing equal treatment of equals, composition, consistency and exclusion.
Proof. We know that CEL and CEA are dual rules. Moreover,
composition is the dual property of path independence (Claim 2), exclusion
is the dual property of exemption (Claim 4), and equal treatment of equals
and composition are dual of themselves. Therefore, the result follows from
Theorem 0.
Remark 2 For two-person bankruptcy problems the notions of exemption
and exclusion turn out to be equivalent to those of sustainability and preem-
inence, respectively, introduced in Herrero & Villar (1998). In the n-person
case, however, exemption and exclusion are weaker properties.
4.2 Independence of claims truncation and composi-
tion from minimal rights
The following properties also represent alternative principles of claims en-
forceability. One focuses on the case in which there is some agent whose
individual claim exceeds the available estate. It proposes to scale down this
unfeasible claim to reality. The other introduces the notion of undisputed
amounts, as those which are left to the agent when all other got their claims
fully honored. It says that the solution cannot grant an agent less than her
undisputed amount. Let us be more precise about these ideas.
Consider a bankruptcy problem in which the claim of some individual
agent is larger than the estate. How a rule should treat her demand? One of
the principles that appears in the Talmud says that one should not consider
16any claim that is greater than the estate. That is, replacing ci by E if ci >E
should not a¤ect the recommendation. Formally,
Independence of claims truncation (Dagan, 1996): For all N 2Nand
for all (E;c) 2 BN;F(E;c)=F(E;cT); where cT
i =m i n fE;cig for all i 2 N:
This property establishes that if an individual claim exceeds the total to
be allocated, the excess claim should be considered irrelevant. The rationale
behind is that “one cannot claim more than there is; thus the excess of a claim
above the estate is irrelevant. A rule is independent of claims truncation if
it allocates the estate taking into account only the relevant claims.” [Cf.
Dagan (1996, p.53)].
In order to present the next property let us start by introducing the notion
of minimal rights. For a given problem (E;c) 2 B de…ne the agents’ minimal
rights as:




The number mi(E;c) represents the amount of the estate that is left to the
ith agent when the claims of all other agents are fully honored, provided this
amount is nonnegative. And it is taken to be zero otherwise. Let m(E;c)
denote the vector in Rn
+ whose components are the minimal rights mi(E;c);
i 2 N:
The next property says that a rule should honor agents’ minimal rights
before any further step is taken. Hence it asks the rule to allocate …rst
the amounts corresponding to these minimal rights and then solving the
remaining problem. Formally,




Composition from minimal rights is a particular form of composition that
says the following: the solution of any problem (E;c) 2 BN coincides with
the outcome of a process in which minimal rights m(E;c) are allocated …rst,
and the rule is applied to the problem consisting of the remaining estate
E ¡
P
i2N mi(E;c) and the outstanding claims c¡m(E;c):
It is easy to see that CEAsatis…es independence of claims truncation and
fails to satisfy composition from minimal rights. CEL satis…es composition
from minimal rights and fails to satisfy independence of claims truncation.
P fails to satisfy both. Moreover,
17² Claim 5. Independence of claims truncation and composition from
minimal rights are dual properties.
The following results are obtained:
Theorem 4 (Dagan, 1996, Prop.1) The constrained equal-awards rule is
t h eo n l yr u l ei nB satisfying equal treatment of equals, composition, and
independence of claims truncation.
>From this result, together with Claims 2, 5 and Theorem 0, it follows
that:
Theorem 5 (Herrero, 2000) The constrained equal-losses rule is the only rule
in B satisfying equal treatment of equals, path independence, and composition
from minimal rights.
4.3 Self-duality
A rule is called self-dual when it coincides with its dual, that is, when
F(E;c)=c ¡ F(L;c). Formally,
Self-duality (Aumann and Maschler, 1985): For all N 2Nand for all
(E;c) 2 BN;F(E;c)=F¤(E;c):
Self-duality is a property that introduces a principle of symmetry in the
behaviour of the solution with respect to awards and losses. It says that the
same principle is to be applied if we think of (E;c) either as a distribution
problem or as a rationing scheme. This property is also inspired in the
Talmud and establishes that dividing “what is there” and dividing “what is
not there” should be treated in a symmetric way.
Note that, according to our de…nition of a rule, it follows that c = F(L+
E;c) so that self-duality can be rewritten as
F(L + E;c)=F(L;c)+F(E;c)
which may be regarded as an instance of additivity.
The following result is obtained:
Theorem 6 (Young, 1988) T h ep r o p o r t i o n a lr u l ei st h eo n l yr u l ei nB sat-
isfying equal treatment of equals, composition and self-duality.
18Remark 3 Young’s original proof includes the requirement of continuity.5
Yet it is easy to see that the only continuity which is actually needed is con-
tinuity with respect to the estate and this follows from composition (Claim
1).
By using the duality relation, the following result is also obtained:
Theorem 7 The proportional rule is the only rule in B satisfying equal
treatment of equals, path-independence and self-duality.
5 AND D’ARTAGNAN
The Talmud rule is the fourth of our three rules. It is a procedure that has
been designed in order to accommodate the solutions given in the Talmud to
a number of practical distribution problems. Auman & Maschler (1985) pro-
pose this rule as the consistent extension of the so called contested garment
rule, a solution concept de…ned for two-person bankruptcy problems.
The contested garment rule can be described as follows:






Therefore, G concedes to both agents their minimal rights and then di-
vides equally the reminder.
The contested garment rule satis…es equal treatment of equals, self-duality,
independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights.
From this and the theorems in section 4 it follows that it fails to satisfy
composition and path-independence. It is also easy to see that it satis…es
neither exemption nor exclusion, which also serves the purpose of separating
these properties from those of composition from minimal rights and indepen-
dence of claims truncation.
The following characterization result is obtained:
Theorem 8 (Dagan, 1996) The contested garment rule is the only two-person
rule satisfying self-duality and independence of claims truncation.
5This property says the following: For all N 2N; all (E;c) 2 BN; and all (Eq;c q) 2 BN
such that limq!1 Eq = E; and limq!1 cq = c; then limq!1 F(Eq;c q)=F(E;c).
19The following result is a direct implication of Theorem 8 and the duality
relation stated in Claim 4:
Theorem 9 The contested garment rule is the only two-person rule satisfying
self-duality and composition from minimal rights.
Remark 4 Dagan (1996) also shows that the contested garment rule is the
only rule in B2 that satis…es equal treatment of equals, independence of claims
truncation and composition from minimal rights.
Therefore, the contested garment rule appears as a way of reaching an
agreement between the principles of composition from minimal rights and
independence of claims truncation. Indeed, this rule can also be regarded as
a compromise between the CEA and the CEL rules. To see this simply note














>From this point of view the contested garment rule behaves as the con-
strained equal awards rule for values of the estate not exceeding the minimum
claim of the agents, and it behaves as the constrained equal-losses rule for
values of the estate above the maximum claim.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) introduced the Talmud rule as the consis-
tent extension of the contested garment rule.
Talmud rule, T (Aumann and Maschler, 1985): For all N 2N; all (E;c) 2




2ci;¸g if E · 1
2C
maxf1
2ci;c i ¡ ¹g if E ¸ 1
2C
where ¸ and ¹ are chosen so that
P
i2N Ti(E;c)=E:
Apart from its justi…cation as the consistent extension of the contested
garment rule, the rationale of the Talmud rule is based in the psychological
principle of “more than half is like the whole, whereas less than a half is like
nothing”. Thus, it seems natural to look at the size of the awards when they
are below half of the claim, and to look at the size of the losses above half
of the claim. This, together with a principle of equal treatment, in which all
agents are at the same side of the half-way psychological watershed amounts
to construct the Talmud rule.
20As a consequence, we have the following result:
Theorem 10 The Talmud rule is the only rule in B satisfying consistency,
self-duality and composition from minimal rights.
Because of self-duality, and the dual relationship between composition
from minimal rights and independence of claims truncation, the following
alternative characterization of the Talmud solution is obtained:
Theorem 11 The Talmud rule is the only rule in B satisfying consistency,
self-duality and independence of claims truncation.
6 FINAL REMARKS
We have presented a number of results that characterize four classical solu-
tions to bankruptcy problems: the proportional rule, the constrained equal
awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, and the Talmud rule. Each
rule may be regarded as implementing a speci…c notion of fairness, whose
application may depend on the type of problem considered. One can say,
roughly speaking, that the …rst three rules are similar in that they apply an
egalitarian principle, and di¤er in the variable they aim at equalizing (ratios,
awards or losses). The Talmud rule applies a protective criterion that ensures
that each individual agent su¤ers a rationing that is “of the same sort” of
that experienced by the whole society.
Theorem 1 provides us with a joint characterization of the proportional
rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses
rule. This result emphasizes the common features of these three rules and
gives support to their choice as the leading candidates to the resolution of
bankruptcy problems. The characterization of each of these rules is taken up
in Theorems 2 to 6. A relevant feature of these characterizations is that they
allow us to compare the three rules in terms of a single di¤erential property.
This facilitates the selection among these rules depending on the nature of
the bankruptcy problem considered. The last theorems serve the purpose
of characterizing the Talmud rule and also to show the relationship between
this and the former rules (indeed the Talmud rule happens to satisfy some
of the properties that permit the separation of the other rules).
We have shown that choosing one of the rules that satisfy simultaneously
equal treatment of equals, composition, path independence and consistency,
amounts to choosing one among three clear-cut principles: exemption, exclu-
sion or self-duality (theorems 2, 3 and 6 or 7). Or, alternatively, independence
21of claims truncation, composition from minimal rights or self-duality (theo-
rems 4, 5 and 6 or 7). The Talmud rule exhibits the surprising feature of
satisfying simultaneously three of the properties that permits one to achieve
the separation among the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained
equal losses rule and the proportional rule. That is to say, the Talmud rule
satis…es independence of claims truncation, composition from minimal rights
and self-duality (theorems 10 and 11).
Note that the principles of exemption and independence from claims trun-
cation, on the one hand, and exclusion and composition from minimal rights,
on the other, are pair-wise logically independent. Indeed there is no rule that
can satisfy exemption and exclusion simultaneously, whereas the properties
of independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights
are satis…ed by the Talmud rule.
All these results illuminate on the kind of problems for which each solution
might be better. The constrained equal awards rule seems appropriate for
those problems in which individuals are the primary concern, whereas their
claims only represent maximal aspirations. The principles of exemption and
independence of claims truncation express this notion in two di¤erent for-
mats. In one case it is assumed that those claims that are relatively small
are to be fully honored. In the other case that all those claims larger than
the estate are indistinguishable. Here individuals go …rst. As a consequence,
agents with smaller claims obtain a relatively higher satisfaction of their
demands.
The constrained equal-losses rule is a sensible rationing scheme for those
problems in which claims represent real entities of an absolute nature (e.g.
unalienable rights or vital needs, to take two extreme cases). The principles
of exclusion and composition from minimal rights convey this message. Ex-
clusion says that in case of great need those who are only entitled to minor
shares are to be disregarded. Composition from minimal rights takes as a
starting point a distribution that cannot be objected unless we are ready
to violate agents’ undisputed claims. Therefore, now claims go …rst. As a
consequence, agents with larger claims are given priority in the distribution.
The proportional rule lies somewhere in between since it gives priority
neither to smaller nor larger claims. Hence claims and agents are treated on
an equal foot. The distinctive feature of self-duality suggests that this is the
most natural distribution rule when we think of bankruptcy as a subfamily
of distribution problems in which E c a ne x c e e do ff a l ls h o r to fC; as self-dual
rules allocate awards and losses in the same manner.
The Talmud rule combines the features of these three solutions by tak-
ing into account the size of the estate with respect to the aggregate claim.
22Nobody gets more than half of her claim if the estate is less than half of the
aggregate claim. And nobody gets less than half of her claim if the amount
to be distributed exceeds one half of the total demand. This can be regarded
as implementing a protective criterion according to which nobody losses too
much when there is a small discrepancy and nobody gains too much when
there is a large de…cit. Composition from minimal rights ensures the …rst
part of this protective criterion, and independence from claims truncation
the second one. Then, self-duality introduces the symmetry between both
parts.
T h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l es u m m a r i z e st h er e s u l t si nf o r m e rs e c t i o n s .“ Y ”m e a n s
that the rule satis…es the property and “N”t h a ti td o e sn o t .“ Y ( * ) ”( r e s p .
“Y(+)”) means that this property, together with the other with (*) (resp.
with (+)) in the column, characterizes the rule.
Properties / Rules CEA CEL P T
Equal treatment Y(*)(+) Y(*)(+) Y(*)(+) Y
Composition Y(*)(+) Y Y(*) N
Path-Independence Y Y(*)(+) Y(+) N
Consistency Y(*) Y(*) Y Y(*)(+)
Exemption Y(*) NNN
Exclusion N Y(*) NN
Ind.Claims Trunc. Y(+) NNY(+)
Comp.Min.Rights N Y(+) N Y(*)
Self-duality NN Y(*)(+) Y(*)(+)
23APPENDIX: P r o o f so ft h ec l a i m s
² Claim 1. If a solution F satis…es either composition or path indepen-
dence then Fi(E;c) is continuous in E; for all i 2 N:
Proof.
L e tu sp r o v et h er e s u l tf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hF satis…es composition. Let
(E;c) 2 BN, and suppose that Fi(:;c) is not continuous with respect to its
…rst argument for some i 2 N.T h a ti st os a y ,
a =l i m
"!0
Fi(E ¡ ";c) 6= lim
"!0
Fi(E + ";c)=b
Since F is monotonic, a<band a · Fi(E;c) · b: Let Fi(E;c)=°:
(a) Assume that a · °<b :For all j 2 N; let c0
j = cj ¡ Fj(E;c) and let
±>0 be such that Fi(±;c0) <b¡ °. By composition, b<F i(E + ±;c)=
Fi(E;c)+Fi(±;c0) <°+ b ¡ °; which is a contradiction.
(b) In the case a<°· b; a similar argument applies.
² Claim 2. Composition and path independence are dual properties.
Proof.
Let (E;c) 2 BN;E 1;E 2 2 R+ with E1+E2 = E:By de…nition, F ¤(E;c)=
c¡F(L;c)=c¡F(C¡E1¡E2;c): Now call L1 = C¡E1;z= F(L1;c), Z = Pn
i=1 zi: When F satis…es path independence we have F(L;c)=F(L;z)=
F(Z ¡ E2;z)=z ¡ F ¤(E2;z): Therefore,
F
¤(E;c)=c ¡ z + F
¤(E2;z)





That is, F¤ satis…es composition.
Similarly, F(E;c)=c¡F ¤(L;c): Let y = F ¤(L1;c) and suppose that F ¤
satis…es composition, that is,
F(E;c)=c ¡ F
¤(L;y)=c ¡ z + F(E2;z)
= F(E1;c)+F(E2;z)
That is, F satis…es path independence.
24² Claim 3. The three rules, P; CEA; and CEL satisfy equal treatment
of equals, consistency, composition, and path-independence.
Proof.
Consistency and equal treatment are immediate. It is also very easy to
see that the proportional rule satis…es composition and path independence.
Let us prove that the CEL rule satis…es composition and path independence
(the proof for the CEA rule goes along the same lines).
(i) Consider …rst the property of composition.
Let (E;c) 2 BN;E 1;E 2 2 R+ with E1 + E2 = E; and consider the
associated problems (E1;c); (E2;c 0) where for all i 2 N;c0
i = ci¡CELi(E1;c):
We have to show that CEL(E;c)=CEL(E1;c)+CEL(E2;c 0):
Clearly, C>E 1: Moreover, C0 = C¡E1 >E 2: Thus, there exist ¸;¸
0 > 0
such that for all i 2 N;
CELi(E1;c)=m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸g;
CELi(E2;c




Note that for all i 2 N; c0
i · ¸ because, by de…nition, c0
i = ci if ¸ ¸ ci
and c0
i = ¸ if ¸<c i: Therefore, ¸
0 · ¸: Next we show that, for all i 2 N;
CELi(E1;c)+CELi(E2;c 0)=m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸
0g:
Let i 2 N besuch thatCELi(E1;c)=0 : Since c0
i = ci; then CELi(E1;c)+
CELi(E2;c 0)=m a x f0;c i¡¸
0g: Now let i 2 N be such thatCELi(E1;c) > 0:
Note that CELi(E1;c)=ci¡¸; and c0
i = ¸: Thus, CELi(E2;c 0)=m a x f0;¸¡
¸
0g = ¸ ¡ ¸
0; because ¸ ¸ ¸
0: Hence, CELi(E1;c)+CELi(E2;c 0)=ci ¡ ¸
0:
As ci¡¸ ¸ 0 and ¸ ¸ ¸
0; it follows that ci ¡¸
0 ¸ 0; and thus CELi(E1;c)+
CELi(E2;c 0)=m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸
0g:
(ii) Let us consider the case of path independence. We have to show
that for any problem (E;c) 2 BN; and all E0 2 R+ with E0 >E ;we have




i =m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸g
CELi(E;c)=m a x f0;c i ¡ ¸
0g
CELi(E;c






i =0we have ci · ¸<¸
0; so that CELi(E;c0)=0=CELi(E;c).
Take now the case in which c0
i = ci ¡ ¸>0. Then, c0
i >c i ¡ ¸
0: Let
N+ ½ N denote the set of indices for which c0




i=1 CELi(E;c0); and c0













(ci ¡ ¸ ¡ ¹)
which is only possible if ¸







i ¡ ¹ = CELi(E;c0); otherwise
² Claim 4. Exemption and exclusion are dual properties. Moreover,
there is no rule that can satisfy these two properties simultaneously.
Proof.
Let (E;c) 2 BN and let F be a rule that satis…es exclusion. By de…nition







That is, F¤ satis…es exemption. Similarly, suppose that F ¤ satis…es exemp-
tion. Then, F(E;c)=c¡F ¤(L;c): When ci · L
n we have F¤
i (L;c)=ci; that
is to say, Fi(E;c)=0 : Therefore, F satis…es exclusion.
To see that there is no rule that can satisfy simultaneously these two
properties, take the case n =2with C =2 E: Without loss of generality
suppose that c1 · c2: Since c1 · E
2 ; exemption implies that F1(E;c)=c1:
Moreover, as L
2 = E
2 · c1; exclusion implies that F1(E;c)=0 : But this is
incompatible with the former conclusion..
² Claim 5. Independence of claims truncation and composition from
minimal rights are dual properties.
Proof.
Let (E;c) 2 BN and let F be a rule that satis…es composition from
minimal rights. By de…nition we have:
F
¤(E;c)=c ¡ F(L;c)
= c ¡ m(L;c) ¡ F[L ¡ M(L;c);c¡ m(L;c)]
Let c0 = c ¡ m(L;c); so that C0 = C ¡ M(L;c); and let L0 = C0 ¡ E:








= ck ¡ maxf0;c k ¡ Eg =m i n fck;Eg
That is, F¤ satis…es independence of claims truncation.
Similarly, assume that F ¤ satis…es independence of claims truncation.
Then, F(E;c)=c ¡ F ¤(L;c)=c ¡ F ¤(L;c0); where:
c
0
k =m i n fck;Lg = ck ¡ maxf0;c k ¡ C + Eg




0 ¡ C + E;c
0)
= m(E;c)+F[E ¡ M(E;c);c¡ m(E;c)]
That is, F satis…es composition from minimal rights.
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